



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THE
CANADIAN MILITIA!

Its Organization and present condition.

BY
LIEUT.-COL. DAVIS,

Commanding 37th Regt. of Militia, or The Essex Militia.

—C O N T E N T S—

PUBLISHED BY
WILLIAM T. SAWLE, 66 GRAND RIVER STREET, MONTREAL,
CALIFORNIA, ONTARIO.


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LIEUT. - COL. DAVIS,

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WILLIAM T. SAWLE, "GRAND RIVER SACHEM" OFFICE,
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PREFACE.

Military or Militia matters being generally neglected in Canada, the author of the following pages can scarcely hope that his efforts to awaken public attention to the subject will meet with better success than those of his predecessors in the same task, who wrote with the same object in view.

The only apology then necessary for republishing the letter of "L. C." which appeared in the *Hamilton Times* in May last is furnished by the following extracts, one from a speech of Hon. Mr. Langevin, acting Minister of Militia and Defence, the other from the *Volunteer Review* of June 21th, 1873:

"Hon. Mr. LANGEVIN agreed to a certain extent with the reasons for Lambton. The intention was not to continue the system at present. They had about seen that it had not produced the results expected, and therefore the Militia Department had found it necessary of admitting young men indiscriminately, that certain men should be restricted to men holding commissions or wishing to qualify for such position. The Department hoped to come down next year with a new proposition. He admitted that the troops would not give the result expected. Nothing would give the Government more satisfaction than to improve the system; and he would inform the House of Commons next year when the stores purchased from the Imperial Government would be paid for, a reduction in the expenditure would be made."

The *Volunteer Review* commenting on a letter in the *Volunteer Times*, says:

"We hope the *Times* will keep the subject before the country, it needs ample discussion, as the Volunteer officers in the House of Commons appear to have ignored their connection with the forces altogether."

YORK, October 20, 1873.

THE CANADIAN MILITIA

ITS ORGANIZATION AND PRESENT CONDITION.

In considering the question of Canadian defence, the great difficulty that presents itself now-a-days, is that there is no plan for combination and concerted action between the Imperial and Colonial forces, and that neither Imperial or Canadian authorities have apparently given the matter any consideration.

The Committee which in 1862 drafted what is now known as Lyson's Bill, (and of which Sir John A. Macdonald and Sir George Cartier were members,) reported: "That the strategical defence of Canada came within the province of the General Commanding the Forces, but, that, with one thousand miles of open frontier, fifty thousand men in arms, with a reserve of the same number, would be insufficient, without a strong force of Regulars, and a powerful fleet of gunboats."

This report was submitted to Parliament more than ten years ago. Let us see what steps have been taken since then to carry out its recommendations, Sir John A. Macdonald being head of the Government, Sir George being head of the Militia Department.

There is a nominal force of 13,000 Volunteer Militia scattered over the Dominion from Halifax to Montreal, but where are the Regulars? Where the gunboats? Where the General Commanding the forces? Where the fifty thousand reserve?

But people may say, What is the use of bringing this very question to the front now, when everything is so calm and peaceful? Well, there are lots of unbelievers who hold that the era of peace and brotherly love, assured by the Washington Treaty, is nothing more than a breathing spell for the Yankees, to get up some fresh demand. This may be so, or not. In any case, a well organized Militia is a necessity for Canada; for we have already proved our right to be a grasping, covetous tyrant, and if we want to look upon our rights as reasonably well insured, we must keep up a good fighting establishment, not only to secure our liberties, but because the knowledge of such a fact actually lessens the danger of war.

is no such arrangement, nor any provision for such an equitable system of service. Some counties give a regiment, some don't give a man. Two or three townships in another county furnish the regiment, the majority of the townships in the same county not giving a single volunteer. One place provides men and money for the defence of the country, the other does nothing of the kind; yet the township that supplies from seventy to a hundred men pay just as much tax as the township that gives neither a man or a dollar; *both are equally patriotic in the eye of the law.*

Here, then, is one of the inherent defects of our militia. The quota not being regularly apportioned, the service is not conducted, (a standing ground of complaint) and what adds to the inconvenience, that there is no system, planned or perfected, for *obtaining men for the active militia at all, other for the Volunteers.*

Up until 1863 the volunteer militia corps were all independent companies, with the exception of Six Battalions in Upper, and none in Lower Canada. In 1866 Colonel Macdougall organized the existing companies into Battalions, giving to each a county designation and permanent head-quarters. The difficulty of obtaining men, even in his day was frequently brought to his notice, and the draft of the Militia Bill which he prepared, recommended either the ballot, or a compulsory rotation of service. Which of these alternatives the country will now take up will very soon have to be determined on, for every man knows that the Volunteer Militia exists now by its own choice, and that it needs but little more indifference and neglect to dissolve itself to pieces.

Turn now to the material of the Active or Volunteer Militia. In cities and towns it is made up, as a rule, of mechanics, warehousemen and clerks. In the rural districts, it is composed of the farmers, sons and their day laborers, of boatmen and mill hand. The ordinary wages of all these workers is from a dollar and a half to two dollars and a half a day; but, when they are called out for annual duty, their pay is fifty cents a day and their rations, worth about 1 cent in red, a total of less than one-half their daily wages. (This is *understated*, if anything, understated; common laborers on railroads now are paid 12s. a day, while farm hands are offered \$10 and \$15 a month, on the year, and board.) But surely the Government makes some provision or grants some privilege to men who make such sacrifices, says the reader. Far from it. There is nothing provided for the man, even when they are on duty, but a forage cap, that helps the sun to peel the skin off their faces, a pair of serge trousers and a uniform coat. Everything in the shape of underclothing—boots, socks, and all the necessary articles for personal cleanliness—have to be provided by the man himself at his own expense. The consequence is, that as there is no uniformity in what the men do procure, not one man out of every twenty has a pair of boots fit to march in, and I saw last year, in one short march from Clifton to Niagara, nearly half a company going barefoot, and the men of two Regiments scattered, limping and straggling along the road for the whole thirteen miles.

We will next look at the organization of the Militia, and begin with the company unit.

is no such arrangement, nor any provision for a uniform system of service. Some counties give a regular militia drill a month. Two or three townships in another county form militia companies; the majority of the townships in the same county are without any volunteer. One place provides men and money for the defence of the country, the other does nothing of the kind; yet the township that supplies from seventy to a hundred men pays only a few cents, as the township that gives neither a man nor a dollar, but is equally patriotic in the eye of the law.

Here, then, is one of the inherent defects of our militia. The quota not being regularly apportioned, the militia is decentralized, (a standing ground of complaint) and what adds to the weakness of it, that there is no system, planned or perfected, for raising and equipping the active militia of all states for the Volunteer.

Up until 1863 the volunteer militia consisted of independent companies, with the exception of Six Battalions in Egypt and Tunis in Lower Canada. In 1866 Colonel Macdonald organized the scattered companies into Battalions, giving to each a county as its permanent head-quarter. The difficulty of obtaining men even on his day was frequently brought to his notice, and the *drafting the Militia Bill* which he prepared, recommended either the militia, or the rotation of service. Which of these alternatives the Government now take up will very soon have to be determined on the emergency laws that the Volunteer Militia exists now by its own efforts, and that it needs but little more indifference and neglect to dissolve itself.

Turn now to the material of the Active or Volunteer Militia. In cities and towns it is made up, as a rule, of mechanics, waiters, men and clerks. In the rural districts, it is composed of the farmers, and their day laborers, of boatmen and mill hands. The country wages of all these workers is from a dollar and a half to two dollars and a half a day; but, when they are called out for militia duty, their pay is fifty cents a day and their ration, while they are on duty, is a total of less than one-half their daily wages. (The wages are, if anything, understated; common laborers on rail roads now are paid 12¢ a day, while farm hands are offered \$10 and \$15 a month, by the year, and heard.) But surely the Government in such a case can or grants some privilege to men who make such sacrifices to the reader. Far from it. There is nothing provided for the soldier, even when they are on duty, but a forage cap, that helps to keep the skin off their faces, a pair of serge trousers, and a uniform coat. Everything in the shape of underclothing, shoes, socks, and other necessary articles for personal cleanliness — have to be provided by the man himself at his own expense. The consequence is, that there is no uniformity in what the men do procure, not one man out of twenty has a pair of boots fit to march in, and I should have seen a short march from Clifton to Niagara, nearly half a company marching barefoot, and the men of two Regiments scattered, limping and straggling along the road for the whole thirteen miles.

We will next look at the organization of the Militia, and begin with the company unit.

A wide-awake tavern keeper, or energetic young fore-keeper, determined to turn to account the excitement which prevailed all over the country in 1866. A public meeting is called and stirring speeches are made. The Country is in danger; "God Save the Queen" is given in all kinds of keys, and "Rule Britannia" with all manner of variations. The Femurs catch it rough (with the tongue). The meeting is not at all unwilling to have a slap at the Yankees, and it is unanimously resolved, that Slabtown must have a Volunteer Rifle Company. Three cheers for the Queen terminates the meeting, which is immediately re-organized in the next tavern.

After a little delay and some difficulty, a sheet of foolscap, with pen and ink is procured, and volunteers press forward by the dozen. Next morning a roll of fifty or sixty names is forwarded to the Militia Department, with the request for a Service Roll and immediate inspection.

The Government, glad to get men, (as there was then every prospect of their being wanted,) make no unnecessary delay, and the papers are sent on forthwith. A letter, with the magic O. H. M. S. on the envelope, renews all the previous excitement. The captain (*in esse*) immediately calls together the company, the last man coming in on an arm, lest he should be late. The conditions of service are read, and every man signs without hesitation: (they are ready then to sign anything.) A week after, the company is inspected by the Brigade Major, who pays them a glowing compliment on their loyalty and fine personal appearance. The next week they are gazetted, and there you are "The Slabtown Volunteer Rifle Company, Captain Blank."

Drill is commenced forthwith, military ardor burns high in the breast of every volunteer, and there is an average attendance of forty, or fifty men. The captain is stern and attentive, and the company really makes wonderful progress. The rifles and uniform arrive, the men are paraded and have a shooting match—and a second company could be organized on the spot. The first year, the company is a perfect success; the next, a slight weakness is apparent; the third year, there is a decided falling off; the fourth year, the captain thinks he can muster about forty, *if he gets time enough*; the fifth, well, he don't know; "the men, you see, were called out to drill in t year at a bad time; a good many of them lost their boy, and some more lost their places, and they didn't like the way they were treated when in camp at Tercho," etc. The sixth year, the captain and ten or a dozen men are all that remains of that famous company. The novelty has worn off, the excitement died out, and nothing has been introduced as a substitute for either; and although a capital drill shed, costing some \$700 or \$800, has been erected at the company headquarters, the shed is devoted to agricultural shows.—Where the tramp of armed men, and the sharp word of command could be heard a couple of nights in the week, you will now find two or three threshing machines; and where you could turn out forty men in two or three hours, you may now hunt all day and not be able to parade a dozen. Patriotism and pluck, with here and there an eye to business, was the motive power which started the volunteers; but the organization (if you choose to call it such) of all, was more or less alike, and all alike are now in the condition of the Slabtown Rifles.

Whose fault is the? With the part of the Government that has done anything might be done (for any Government that has done anything is supported in any measure, no matter at what cost) for the defence of the country, but the golden opportunity was lost, because, apparently, knowing how to embrace it.

But the company is ordered out for the annual drill, and we will start with it to camp. Now is the winter of the Captain's discontent. How the — is he to make up the company? "A fellow, old fellow, won't you come with us to Niagara this year? Nothing much to do, you know, and you will be back before haying." "You can't see it. "Ned, you were a corporal in the old company, eh? Give me then for this drill and I'll make you color-sergeant." "Say, Ned, won't you help me to fill up a bit; here we are for Niagara next Thursday morning and I've only got twelve men; do give us a little of a good fellow; Here are twenty dollars; go and see Pat and Bill and Harry; tell them I will never ask them out again, if they will only come this one time; make the money go as far as you can; no more in my way, I know, and if any of them want to come home before the camp is over, I will get them leave from the Colonel. — the one thing I'll resign."

On the fated Thursday morning, five or six companies are formed up at the station, waiting for the cars, and to look at them one would think that "motley" was the wear of the Canadian militia. Here is a fellow in a straw hat; there one in a wide-brimmed hat; there one in a forage cap, trousers and shirt sleeves; there one with a uniform coat *across his arm*, but no other article of uniform about him; (nothing has to last five years, understand, and has already been worn by two or three parties, coming out *minus* or *plus* something at each transfer.) The rifles and knapsacks alone, look serviceable, the rest of the get up being filthy through carelessness and neglect.

The cars bear in sight at last, and are welcomed by a cheer which is returned with energy by a party of the gallant 19th Regiment, proceeding likewise to camp, and who in the meantime are in strict observance in a war dance on the tops of the coaches. The train has nearly stopped, till the station is covered by a cloud of spectators, ostensibly for water, in reality to "see a man" in every regiment in the neighborhood. By the time the men are on board, the coaches have closed, a good many showing that they have not got it. Off we go, the platforms covered with men, and in front of the cars, a fair proportion of the new arrivals, give conclusive evidence that whiskey at least has done its duty. Any attempt at discipline fails. The men have not been together before for a year, and they are greenhorns, who never were in uniform, who don't know their officers. Many of the officers only hold positions of honor or Regimental appointments, and won't attempt the exercise of any authority. The non-commissioned officers know nothing of their duties, and if they did, are not going to make a scene with their neighbors, may be their own relatives. The men talk and act absolutely without restraint, and jump off in scores at every stopping place, in all stages of drunkenness, and in every variety of dress. I have seen and heard myself, of almost every camp that has been held by a soldier in uniform, from insulting women, to insulting their officers.

be all in the way to and from camp, the men will not certainly appear fit. Now, if the efficiency of the Canadian Militia be limited by these considerations, it is not an officer or man of experience who is to be blamed. He will laugh at the idea. The Adjutant General will support the gratitudo of every volunteer for getting fit, and every man will drill, and if he had the inspired leader that makes men want to, to move into camp, no doubt he would be ready to do it and be happy to, but, in the present condition, the command is a mere show. The men will be even bribed for the camp, and will all be in a boy or decrepit old man, if they can only get the money to get out with. Thank, and live in the camp, even, the whole year, and they will know off a ditch. Try the experiment. Turn one regiment out of these Regiments into Camp and see the result.

Even if the men were all able-bodied, *here is the matter*, in their respect to camp, the time allowed for drill is too short, even if even an impossible, much less to impart any real knowledge of instruction. The first week is a mere settling down, and learning the men, and drill, and what their command is, and how to use them, and in hammering as much as possible, and to hammer exercise into them, time will allow. The second week is that is left for real work, and in six days the men are supposed to go through the whole field exercise, from the parade to the drill, besides doing their share of the camp work, and even having been instructed in that duty, half practice, and having been taught how to use, rifle, and pistol, and how to use the meaning of the word. As for outposts, they are not even in the same happy state of ignorance. No man will attempt any such duty ever attempted, nor was there time for any attempt.

But the camp is over. The regiments are broken up, and dissolved into the original elements of six or eight companies. And see, now, the relative positions of captain and company, and how they are affected by the eight or six companies in the camp of instruction. *Imprimis*, each captain is almost independent company in itself—together independent of the other companies in the Regiment. By the Act of 1868, a captain can order out his company, without leave or license from the Lieutenant Colonel, and if the men choose to turn out, he can have a parade. He can't leave them out, however, inasmuch as he is met by the adjutant. We have a man in our drill for the year, and you have no claim on us." On the other hand, if he attempts compulsion and fire, the adjutant will be on their regiments, and there is another defect in the matter. The only duty, then, the captain has to do, from one year to the next, after returning from camp, is the care of the arms and dress of the company, and that he can attend to or not, just as he pleases. The Colonel has no power to compel him. Regimental or company officers, on the convenience of the parties concerned, may be charged and summoned, if not, not when the Commanding Officer is pleased in the same position of issuing an order which he knows to be impossible, but which he cannot enforce. All the responsibilities of carrying out the understanding, upon "which the efficiency of any command is dependent," the habits of carrying out orders and in the same way.

are only obtained by constant practice, and not by a parade and neglect. Even when officers have been reported neglectful, or for disobedience of orders, and without more than a reprimand, the satisfaction obtainable was, "There is no more to be said to Ottawa. They will never dismiss a man for such a crime."

Now, I've heard it asserted that our troops were thoroughly equipped, and the men ready to take the field at a moment's notice. Well, there was not an ambulance in the camp, nor a stretcher, not even transport for mail and ammunition. There was no medicine provided for the sick, and no first aid instrument I know of; while the men lay on the floor of the barracks with a single blanket. There wasn't a set of Pioneer Tools in the Division, except in the Queen's Own, and they were bought by the officer; and *apropos* to this point, I know an officer, who, on the morning of this sham fight, sent down town to borrow, or buy, half a dozen of pickaxes and shovels, and they were not to be procured in the camp or town.

I have already noticed the boots. Look now at the belts round ponches! A skirmisher would not be so old-fashioned as to rely on his back. Old belts, that were through the Crimea, Russia, and that will scarcely hold anything, an Italian, or a Frenchman, or a German, of his limbs, cannot be got at, while he holds the reins. But, and all of the same beautiful thing, polished by repeated use, and of grease and dirt, contrasted hand only with the uniform of the Rifleman, and the red coat of the Infantry. Add to this, that in the Division would average half a dozen non-commissioned officers thoroughly conversant with their duties, nor thirty sergeants who could perfectly sound a call. There wasn't an Armour Sergeant in either of the Brigades, while there should be one in every Battalion.

Such is the organization, material and discipline of what is grandiloquently called "The Canadian Army," and which our officers maintain, should furnish a Brigade to take part in the next German manoeuvre in England. The whole system is a mere shadow existing on paper so thin that will fall to pieces on the first storm. The same kind of material will be scratched together again in the same way, for the next camp, and so the show goes on.

Let us look at another noticeable defect in our system. If all officers should be qualified before being appointed to a position, the out-set, has been totally ignored, and is still almost entirely neglected, even required to qualify, after they are gazetted. If we could but see the acquirements of our officers, and how many more need to be made? Take the Artillery for example, and leaving out the two regiments of artillery at Kingston and Quebec, how many of the present holders of the rudiments of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Geology, Drawing, Surveying, Field Works and Fortification, and these are not half of what they are supposed to have at the present time. How many of our Infantry officers could pass the examination required now from a Lieutenant in the Line before being promoted to Captain?

I will give a portion *only* of what is laid down in General Order of September the 17th, 1872.

"Definition of Tactics, Tactical Units of the Three Arms, Principles which Regulate their Strength. General Functions of the Three Arms.

Also but many "The Battalion," Its organization for tactical purposes, Rate of marching, Principles and object of its formation and evolutions, viz.: Line, Column, Section, Square, Change of front, Change of position, Principles of the employment of the Battalion in action. In counter-attack, In the attack, In the pursuit, In the retreat, In position of the three arms for defence and offence, according to the above principles, The attack and defence of fortified point, The passage of rivers, Principles of the conduct of reconnaissance, Outpost duty, &c., &c."

How many of our Lieut.-Colonels have any knowledge of the theory or of the higher duties of the profession applicable to the rank which they hold? How many have heard of, or read the "Wellington's Essay," or "The Tactical Retrospect," or "The Infantry Battalion of the Autumn Manœuvres"? How many copies of "The Defence" or "The practice of the art of Infantry Fire in Action" are in the hands? How many have seen the new orders for Brigade attack, and are ready to impart the necessary information and instruction concerning them to their own Battalion? These illustrations are only offered to make of example, and to show if such qualifications are required in the Regular Army, how much more are they now in absolute necessity for Canada?

Read what one of the highest military authorities of the day, the late Sir John Burgoyne, says: "The very best troops in the world, and the best of our Volunteers are very irregular, however formidable they may be for individual valor—*are useless in mass*. In order to our deficiency in drill and discipline appears, for a good deal more than pluck and coolness is required, when opposed to troops of average bravery. It is then you have the greatest need of a good staff of officers, for when men are only half trained, your only hope is individual intelligence, and strict discipline."

Any force to be efficient, must keep up with the times, and those that know our Militia will say that our officers possess not only a lack of command, and that special knowledge of the duties of their respective ranks, which is of so much importance nowadays. What the most latest improvements based on experiment, or actual experience, are suitable for the field of modern warfare, our tactics, our drill, our organization and equipment, are all inadequate but inferior to all that is to, while no attempt whatever has been made to supply the most important wants of the Militia—trained and expert, good officers, a sure supply of men. But fighting, after all, is the last and worst part of a war. It is the preparation which is the most important, therefore, perfect organization, and undoubted firmness, therefore, in every branch of the service, with superior discipline, will alone enable this country to make up for paucity of numbers, for Canada has not men enough to spare to learn how to fight, as Grant took Richmond, viz.: *by expending* so many men a day.

But what are the Military Schools for? and what are they doing? says the reader. Well the first two years they were open they were for the special benefit of the Service Militia—a force which neither then, or now has any existence. The schools were closed up against Volunteer officers, unless they resigned. Although the folly of this course was soon apparent, and the schools thrown open to all, yet, as there was no compulsory qualification demanded, it was only in the cities where the schools were established, and to a limited

neighborhood, that they were taken advantage of by the schoolmaster, at least, who did not belong to neither Volunteer Corps, but joined the school for the sake of "making money." The schoolmaster, 5,000 cash is claimed, I question very much if he was not a Volunteer in the Dominion.

The present state of the School, too, however, will be a sufficient present attendance shows, and the very fact that the Schools were reopened (Volunteer Corps) is a rule, do not attend them. The schoolmaster, too, is a present school is far too small, and the schoolmaster, too, is a schoolmaster, let them work as hard as they can, but they can hardly expect to do more than give a good time. Exercise. They haven't got time, I think, to do more than a glance at the higher duties of the school, and a thorough training in general discipline, and the schoolmaster, too, is a schoolmaster.

For the present condition of the Canadian Militia, the Imperial authorities are far more to blame than our Government but Mr. Gladstone's would be a happy day, if the regular troops at the time, and in the same manner, as the other Government but Mr. Gladstone's would be a happy day, if at all, until they were satisfied that the Militia were in such a condition of preparation, that they could hold it ground, till reinforcements could be sent. Government but Mr. Gladstone's, after, knowing that they have always been taught to depend upon the Imperial Government, General and Scientific officer, would be a happy day, if single one of either. As long as there was even one of the Militia Regiments in Ontario and Quebec, the Volunteer Militia, too, to guide them, and derived proportion to the regular troops, superior knowledge. Moreover, the Regular troops, too, took all pains to create a healthy feeling of emulation, and the Militia and the Volunteers were brigaded together, and the Militia, too, were in the confidence of the Regular troops, they knew they were to fight alongside the Regular troops, and the moveable columns of Col. Macdougall. Wherever they were, anywhere, and try to do anything, although they were a Regular Regiment, and a couple of companies of Militia, too, that they would be properly led, that they were not a Regular Regiment of professional soldiers, and would have the advantage of the Militia, too, men whose trade was war.

Who is to command now? Where are the Regular troops? Where are the Scientific officers? Where the men to initiate, and to guide, and to supply in the field? Where are the Engineers, and who are to do anything of pontoons, field telegraphy, or army signalling? Where are the Commissariat, no Transport, no Ordnance, no Store, and no Hospital department, no Wagon train, no Intrenching tools, and nothing but a handful of half-qualified officers, a nominal strength of 43,000 men, and forty light field guns, 6 and 9 pounder.

Now, if Britain, with 90,000 Regular troops at home, with 12,000 Militia, with 180,000 Volunteers, and with nearly 170,000 Militia, could not put in the field, with a month's notice, 100,000 effective men, how long would it take Canada, under present conditions, to put 50,000 effective men on the frontier, and organize and equip them more in reserve?

But compare the Canadian policy of Great Britain with the Canadian policy of Spain, post-di-factum Spain. Well, post-di-factum Spain is, by its policy, forced to keep 31,000 fighting men in Cuba, and to send as many more to the rest of the island to hold the land and keep his teeth in place, that is to say, that is to say, with him, and they are to keep a respectful distance. He knows well, if he did not know it before, he will have to fight, and that is to say, he has no choice but to fight with such an opponent as Spain.

Every nation under the sun, worthy of the name, has a right to death to it. Colonel, and only, surrenders was not a surrender in Spain. Britain, in Mr. Gladstone's hands, is a nation, the only one, exception; for perhaps it over its smoothness, and it is the same. The sinned. "Would to God we were all of them!" in the words of the Canadian.

If there was any of the old spirit in existence that was in the old British Empire, you would see, you think of your old friends, removing the garrison out of Quebec. There would be no more language used as in late years, "as often come, as the Times Notice, or even of separation, should come from a colony, but never from the Mother Country." Compare the tone of the *Times* a few years ago, with its utterances of a few weeks ago. So, knowing the Alabama Claim, October 18, 1865, it says: "If the American Government is determined to force a quarrel, as well as the American excuse." Seven years later, after using the same language, the very Alabama collision, the *Times* says: "Take up your liberty, and your life. We have left you nothing worth fighting for, keeping you can go." Many a blunder has been committed in the course of the last fifty years, but it will be another half-century before the word and deed of Mr. Gladstone, his colleagues and his successors, will be forgotten in Canada.

When an urgent appeal, on behalf of the Canadian Government, was made by the Hon. Mr. Campbell, who went to England for the purpose, that a small Imperial garrison should be retained in the city, Mr. Gladstone, forgetting apparently that the British and Canadian are reciprocal, refused the request. Fortunately, the British Government only came from Ireland, receive Mr. Gladstone's attention, but when Canada asked that a small Imperial garrison be left in Quebec, that was only a small Imperial garrison. The British Government was unfortunately ignored. It is a small Imperial garrison, of course, the removal of the troops, was a small Imperial garrison, a work of necessity. Lord Carnarvon's speech, "The thousand men were useless for defence, *which is the position of the source of rebellion to the Americans*," gives the true history of Gladstone's Colonial Policy. The troops were withdrawn from the Yankees; if anything Britain was to do, could please the Yankees and the Quakers, and all the sound Radicals who bellow for the same. The same were the parties whose feelings were consulted—whose interests were considered, for there is no indication anywhere to show that the people of Great Britain desired the troops removed from Canada, or that if the tie between the Colony and the Mother Country, even in the day, it was the "Peoples William" who cut the knot. The very scheme of Confederation, mainly acceptable to Canada, the main cementing Imperial connection, has only been used by Mr. Gladstone and his Cabinet, as a lever for breaking the bond.

was: "It was a tentative measure, and any shortcoming would be removed by and by."

Five years have now passed; more than *six millions of dollars* have been expended; the Bill has been criticised from one end of the country to the other; in it of all rank and of all the different shades, from the out-and-out Conservative, to the ultra-Chinese Radical, in the strongest terms, and with an unwearied argument; and now, in the Act, but there is no change, no alteration, nor amendment. Notwithstanding whatever has been done to improve the condition of the Militia, which is certainly now in a far worse condition, than when the Bill was passed. Nominally and upon paper it may appear stronger, but in reality the vigor and vitality of 1861 and 1862, is gone. The organization of the organization (the company unit) is a matter of fact.

The law allows but fifty-five men in a Company, making no provision for deaths, discharges, or for men leaving the ranks, by giving the usual notice. The Company should be twenty-five men at the least, and then, when you take in losses, and discharges, you will scarcely ever parade fifty-five men. The law makes no provision for keeping any system of records, or of the names of the men; there is no regular system of enrollment; after the first year, no record is forwarded. There is no record of deaths, no claim, no pension, no system of Company, or Regimental book, no company or regimental roll, for either officers, or non-commissioned officers, or privates, who have held rank in the service for more than twelve months, have never qualified for their position. I know other holders of commissions from Volunteer bands, who could not make out a discharge, or a Return, or march off an advance, or a rear guard to save their lives. There is the greatest neglect in regard to drill sheds and armories, as well as in that of clothing, arms, and stores. Uniform coats in the country; not the best, but at least decent. Caps, while overcoats are in general demand for the winter, are not. Captains are paid for doing nothing, and do it some times; and it is not long ago since the writer had a captain, who had been in the service, who had not seen their companies for over a year, while a captain who had lost a number of rifles and nearly all the uniforms, and had three of his company, returned for his yearly cost of maintenance, and the same regularity, as the officer who had not a rifle to his name.

The present Militia Law is defective in many respects. It is lacking all the main requisites of a Military Bill. It places the responsibility of keeping up the Force upon the Government, while it provides no means whatever of recruitment, and as the Militia are disbanded (its supporter maintains) does it provide for the organization of the Service Militia. It makes no provision for the organization of a Reserve at all, nor does it make any provision for the education of officers, or men, with themselves, and the man holding the provisions of the Militia, receives the same pay and allowances as the man holding substantive rank, and who has qualified for his position. It provides for the appointment of a Deputy Adjutant-General, and for Districts to command the Militia, while in nearly all the Districts, the duties are performed by Brigade Major. These duties are doubtless administered the law honestly, and to the best of their ability; but the law itself is at fault, no matter how honestly, and if the country wants to get value for its money, and to see the

Militia kept up to its full strength, and every day of delay and immediate change is a necessity which can't be postponed much longer; for at present the Church Militant is in a state of decay, and worst remunerated service in the Dominion.


But to regulate all this, and to make the most advantage of it, cost money; and where is it to come from? Well, the Government, of course, there is no scarcity of funds at Ottawa, and the Government will devote that old fund, the fund that was set aside for the reorganization of the Militia, and the Government will do it the very best way in which they can possibly do it. But, for, they may find it absolutely impossible to do so, and then for investing it in the Pacific R. R. The Government will say, (if they can't do it in any other way, if they can't do it for the troops, and General Officers, which are absolutely necessary for the efficiency of the Canadian Militia. They can then support all the suggestion of Gen. Sir James Macleod, and the recommendation of Sir John A. Macleod, and then, if they get time enough, can give the subject of the Militia organized on such a basis, a, to render it impracticable.

In a former paragraph the question was asked, How many would it take (and) under present conditions to get 5,000 men in the field, and organize a reserve of the same number? The answer is, it could not be done at all. Assuming the whole 13,000 Militia were called by law to be available, they would not supply 20 per cent of the efficiency is understood in England, France, Germany, etc., and all the Field Artillery in the Dominion, would not furnish the material with the proper proportion of guns. Not a man of the Militia, except what old British soldiers might be in the ranks, could do a day's musketry instruction, nor a day's judging of the accuracy of a shot, if not more than half, of the present material would be capable of a week's active campaigning; while taking 5 years to effect the change was as it should be, there is not a soldiery element at all owing to the Militia, who ever in his life handled 500 yds in the field.

Is this the state the Militia should be in? Do we require an armed force at all? Is the Militia to be paid? If it is not required, why keep up the present system and expense? If it is a necessity how is it to be paid, and its condition are so studiously ignored, and no attempt to improve it? A certain Hon. gentleman, who has been nobly paying attention to Militia matters, has said, "nothing is looked upon with supreme indifference. To the feeling existing, that we must yearly vote a large sum for purposes to show our loyalty, *and that's all.*"

Now, in conclusion, I will simply observe, that after a long and varied experience of the working of the Canadian Militia, and after the old law, as the new, I am clearly and firmly convinced that it is impossible under the present system, or with only token troops, to have an efficient or available militia force, and that the only means of securing it is to have a *shorter term of military duty* and *frank pay for the exemptions to be paid for and the money to be applied to the purchase of the force*,) compulsory qualification for Officers, and a *small* force of Regular troops in support, and qualified General Officers in command of the whole.





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